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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
L.\ WlUJNCE W. BROWN,

Plain tif!-Respondent,
vs.

FRED .JOHNSON and
HOYA T. R'\ KING COMP ANY,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
11899

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
S'I' A T.K'.\I

OF KIND OF CASE

f'I ai 11 tiff';; action for damage;; for personal injuries
i'lr·11n1·cl in rear-ewl eollision.

DCSPOSI'l'ION IN LOWER COURT
'I'li0 jury returned a vcrcliet of no cause of action
in the t'i mt trial. 'I'he court, .Judge MarcPllus K. Snow

'itling-, g-ra11ted plaintiff's rnotiou for a new trial. In
1lie o;r•r·ond tria I, liefon• .J uclge Leonard "'· giton, the
.imy rdurned a \'l'l'(lid for the plai11tiff in the amount
11!' $1 l ,/00.00.
'l'hr• defondmits' motiou for a new trial
11 ;\-; <if'lliPrJ.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff prays that the judgment entert<I. , ,,
the jury verdict in the second trial be affirmed.
STATE:i\IENT OF FACTS
The collision, giving rise to this claim, occurred in
Emigration Canyon on January 11, 1968. The plaintiff,
a student at the University of Utah, was proceeding in
a westerly direction when struck from the rear by the
defendant Johnson driving a Royal Baking Company
truck. Johnson, a route salesman for the bread eompany, had been a commercial driver for 20 years antl
had driven the canyon route more than 1,000 times (R
767-769). The agency of the defendant Johnson was admitted (R. 230).
Prior to the collision the l1efendant J olm:-;011 1rn'
following the plaintiff, before attempting a passillg
maneuver, at a distance of from 15-20 feet (R. 798, Sel'ond Trial, R. 418) on icy, snowpacked roads (R. 773-774)
at a speed of 30 miles per hour (R. 790). No
stop was made before the collision (R. 790) and no horn
was sounded (R. 795). The passing maneuver was attempted at the most densely populated area iu the cauyon (R. 786-787). The defendant admitted that he was
"tailgating" the plaintiff (Second Trial, R. 421) ancl that
he was "too close" (Second Trial, R. 422).
When the def eudant attempted to pass the plaintiff, his front wheels were on the passing lane, almost
to the plaintiff's back wheels, while his back wheels, or
2

of' them, were still in the right-hand or west bound
of I raffi(' (R. 781, 79J). Observing the plaintiff's
iirnk1· lights come on the first time, the defendant attempted to pull back into the westbound lane without
,·ornpleting the passing maneuver (R. 781). Upon pulling hack in line, the defernlant 's truck was following
the· plClintiff at a distance of from two to three feet
( R. 784). When the plaintiff braked a second time, the
('()llision occurred. The plain tiff did not cross the center
line ( R. 789) and the defendant could have uninterruptedly continued his passing maneuver, but for the fear
tl1at tliP plaintiff would skid 011 the slick roads, (R. 789),
<11· tn!'ll left, (R. 781). The plaintiff gave no left-tum
:-ilrnal (H. 784). There was no place to make a left turn
for a su hstantial distance from the point where the col;j,ion on·mTed (R. 783).

11Jlf'

!,'JI<'

l'rior to the collision the plaintiff was proceeding
<lmrn Emigration Canyon at a speed of 20-23 miles
JH·r l1our (R_ 774). Rounding a curve, he observed a
clllal! puppy walking along the side of the roadway
I J; ..-1.-11) "·ltieh turned as if to cross (R. 547). The
)'Lli11tiff brnked, slowing to approximately 10 miles per
l1our (H. 347). Then, to avoid striking the puppy, the
)'lniutiff slowed his ,·chicle a second time to approxifin• milPs per hour (R. 548). The brake lights
1amp on two separate times prior to the impact (R .
181) with a tim0 interval hetwe0n. The impact oc.
1·un1·d wltilP tl1v plaintiff's Yehirle was still mo\"ing, as
1111• plaintiff, hi,; foot off the hrake, prepared to ac<·<·ln;i(p (H. :i-18).
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The 1·ecord shows that the dcfcm1ant was
the plaintiff at a distance of 200 f ePt ( R. 776) on curwd
mountain highway; that thP plaintiff had lookc>rl 'l\t
the rear view mirror on thP way down thP canyon wit/i.
out observing the defendant (R. 549); and that his attention was on the puppy when the impact occurred
(R. 552). Th0 weather was cold and the road was ro1·ercd with ice and snow (R. 5:JO). 'l'hc plaintiff's window was rolled up and there was no time to give a hand
signal (R. 551 ). The defendant admittNl that he ohsen•ed the plaintiff's lirakP lights lit on two separatl'
occasions. (R. 781).

FA<'TS
The plaintiff, an outstanding wn•stler (R. :J38-3G7).
was taken to the U nivcrsity Hospital 011 the day the
collision occurred. The initial examination showed tendernC>ss in the cerYical spine, pain with motion, a!J(l
muscle spasms (R. 61:-l). A preliminary diagnosis, basC'1l
primarily 011 the x-ray findings, determined that the
plaintiff had suffered a subluxation (partial incomplete
dislocation) of the 4th and 5th cenical vertebrae (R.
614-615) and an avulsio11 fraeture of tlw 2lHl c<•rvieal
vertebra (R. 616).
Subsequent x-rays show0d a deerease in the height
of the 4th and 5th, a11d 3th and 6th wrtebral bodies (R.
620). Other symptoms of a ruptured disc i11cluded a
decrease in sensation in the area supplied
the iitli
and 6th cervical nerves, as WPII as a deerease in scnsa4

11t111 111 tli<· bic·c•p,; reflex (R. G19). The latter symptoms
\\ ,., ,, 11c·u rological findings, ohjecti\·ely diagnosed, which
\ ic/1'1, •·il 11en·e injnry (R. 620) .
.\Yt1•r additional examinations and x-ray findings,
ti;•· tn·<1ting physician concluded that the plaintiff had
n rnpt un•d disc (R. 620). The doctor testified that
tl1erc W<ts soft tissue im·olvement and ligamentous <lam(H. 6-1-3). Approximatc•ly eleven months after the
i11,iury, tlw Plaintiff was having tension headaches, reqniri11g medication, and suffering the effects of trauni;1tie arthritis (H. G4-l-, 64:i-G-l-G).
'l'l1c• plaintiff's ph>·sieian testified that it would be
i11a1h·i"alile for the plai11tiff to fnrtlH•r participate in
<·11ntc1d sports, including wrestling (R. 649); that he
li<1d <t :;o 1wr ce11t permanent partial disability of the
1·1,n·ieal spi11e and a 10 per cent permanent partial dis11 l1ilit:• of the total body as a result of the collision (R.

Tl11· :21->·enr-olcl plaintiff required complete rest for
fr\<' ,,.l'l'k, \1·on• a cen·ieal collar for five months, and

],,,,t t 1rn quartPrs of school and eleven weeks work.
1'l1C' defendants dicl not contend that the plaintiff's
i1Jjuric·s had any pre-existing cause (R. 584). Although
1]1,. rn1·diral fads "'l'l'l' disputed h>· tlw defendants, each
rd' tl1<· dodors found substantial injun» (See summary
111· rn1·di<'<il te,;timo11y, plaintiff's mgument, R. 483-488).
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AR GU l\l ENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
The defendants' brief concluded that the jury nr.
diet in the first trial was supported by substantial evidence. It presumed that the jury correctly weighed
controverted evidence and that there was no misapplication of the law which operated to cause a miscarriagl'
of justice (Apps. Brief, 21). The granting of a new
trial, the defendant argued, \ms an abuse of the trial
court's discretion.
These arguments were considered in part by .Justice \Volfe in K i11g r. enion Pacific R. R. Co., 117 rtah
40, 212 P.2d 692. 1 'l'he trial judg·p in the King case contended that certain evidence was "uncontroverted."
This court did not agree. "However," said Justice
\Volfe, " . . . it is not necessary that the ei·idence bP
uncontroi·erted in favor of the moving party before the
trial court can .IJrant a new trial." (Emphasis added).
Further, the evidence before the court in the King casr
was sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff or
the defendant. The court concluded that where competent evidence would support a ,-erdict for the plaintiff, "Nothing more need appear." Most importantly,
1 See also:
Williams v. Ogden Union Ry. and Depot Co. (Utah)
230 P.2d 315, citing the King case. The trial court granted the defendant
a new trial after the jury had returned a verdict for the
court affirmed where " . . . there was competent evidence which woul
have supported a verdict for the defendant."

Thd
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;, cont• 1st to the defendants' argument in the instant
<'ilS<', th<' eourt conrlude<l that,
''The defendants contention that a trial
judge in most cases should not grant a new trial
1l'hen the verdict is supported by substantial competent evidence cannot find support in the authorities." (gmphasis added)
\Yen' this not so, as this court has noted else''"here,' the court's function with respect to weighing
the Pvidence would be limited to interfering only when
it required to do so as a matter of law.

Stack r. Kearnes, 118 Utah 237, 221 P.2d 594, posed
a set of procedural facts on appeal nearly identical to
tliose in the instant case. In the Stack case the plaintiff
at the first trial received a verdict of no cause of action.
Plaintiff's counsel then made a motion for a new trial
ll'hieh was granted by the trial court. The second trial
n·:·mlted in a Yerdict for the plaintiff which was then
<l]Jpealed on the theory that the action of the trial court
iu granting the new trial constituted an abuse of disndio11. Four grounds had been cited as supporting
plaintiff's motion for the new trial, the two most prominent of which were the insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the verdict and the rlaim that the verdict was
against the law.
The trial court in the Stack case did not specify the
or grounds upon which it based its order. The
cl<'fc·1Hia11t in Rt<1ck contended that the ground upon
'See concurring opinion, Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326
P.2d 722.
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which the plaintiff relied m argument, which apparcntly influenced the court in reaching its conclusion,
was that the evidence was insufficient a11d the verdid,
therefore, contrary to law. 3 This was denied by the
plaintiff.
This court affirmed the decision of the trial court
to grant a 11ew trial, assuming that the basis for the
court's decision was, as conh•rnlcd hy the dc>foll(lant,
the single ground that the eYidence \\·as insufficient to
justify the verdiet. The court, eiting King v. Uniu11
Pacific R. R. Co., supra., stated simply that,
" ... where there appears in the record competent evidence which would support a verdict
in favor of the party mo\'ing for a new trial,
there is no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in granting a iww trial upon that
ground." (i.e. the insufficiency of the evidence)'
"Note that this was the plaintiff's argument in the instant case and
that the defendants denied that "insufficiency of the evidence," without
more, justified setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial. (Apps.
Brief, 6, 10).
•See concurring opinion, Holmes v. Nelson, mpra, cited by appellant (Apps. Brief, 10), where Justice Crockett comments that the prior
decisions of the court,
" ... reflect the sound principle that the matter (i.e. the granting
of a new trial) should rest pretty much within the sound discretion
and good conscience of the trial judge. Supponing this view is
the fact that Rule 59(a), giving the court power to grant new trials
for insufficiency of the evidence, must impart something more than
the mere authority to do so when the proof is so lacking that there
should have been a directed verdict. In the latter instance it is the
court's imperative duty not only to set aside the verdict but to dis·
miss the action. Therefore, if any meaning is to be given to the
provision that a new trial may be granted for insufficiency of _the
evidence it must mean something more than the obvious duty JUSt
referred to, i.e. it must repose some discretion in the trial court to
grant new trials for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the ver·
diet, even where there is more than the amount necessary to make
out a prima facie case."
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Tl 1i" coll rt lias consistently acknowledged the
"lirnad'' 1isnetion of the trial judge with respect to
ii:·
or dc•nial of ue\\" trials. The trial judge's
rnlillg 011 such motions should i10t be overturned unless
it ;1ppc•ar:-; that it was "arbitrary," or that it "clearly
transgressed any rcasonahlc hounds of discretion,'" or
ili t Ji c· ;i] i:-;01ire of "plain a husP. "'' Furthermore, the test
;tpjili('rl !1as a ''l1igh dcgTl'C of sul1jcdi,·e content'" where
1lic· 1rial .irnlg<' is concenlC'cl and must, on review, con,;id<'r hi,.; "acln111tagecl'' position "with respect to the
trial."'
1

< ln

this appeal, the evidence is viewed most favor;1liJ:-· to tlw plaintiff." Applying the ahove principles,
it is an iucontestable fact that there is sufficient evid1•11c"' 011 tlw n•conl to support a venlict for the plaintiff.
'l1l1c· findings of the jury in the first trial were
against tlw weight of the evidence and the judge
1·ould not, in g-ood conscience, permit them to stand.
···Hyland v. St. Marks Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736. Cited

i1' Appellant's brief at page 7.

'·Holmes
7

t'.

Nelson, supra.

/d.

'See Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 359, 366 P.2d 791, where the
court stated,
"However since the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses and
had a first hand view of all the evidence, and the proceedings
throughout the trial and has ruled on the admissibility of evidence,
and instructed the jury on the law governing their verdict, and had
opportunity of observing the tactics of the counsel throughout the
trial and the jury's reaction thereto, his ruling on a motion for a
new trial should not be overruled unless it clearly appears that he
has abused his discretion."
"S1<1ck '" Kearnes, supra at 595.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
FAILING TO GIVE THE DEFENDANTS'
PROFFERRED INSTRUCTION NO. 21.
The defendants contend that the trial court erred
in failing to instruct the jury not to consider damages ,
for any disability or expense related to future surgery,
Plaintiff responds as follows:
A. The Plaintiff Waived Any Claim for Such
Damages.
It is true that the plaintiff's physician described
the procedure required for the repair of a herniated disc.
'rhe plaintiff did not, however, present evidence at the '
second trial bearing on the value of hospital and med.
ical expenses, or lost earnings, if future surgery was
required. Such evidence was, over stringent objection,
admitted at the first trial (R. 632-636). Failure to pre·
sent such evidence a second time was, in effect, a
'vaiver by the plaintiff of any claim for damages rc·lated to future surgery. In closing argument, plaintiff's
counsel waived any claim for the value of delayed schooling; for future medical expenses, and for wages and
expenses re la tecl to future surgery ( R. 491).

B. Tl1e Instructions as Given By The Court Arif·
quately Protected the Interests of the Defendant.
The accumulated instructions of the court adequately defined the jury's responsibilities (R. 215-253).
They discussed proximate cause, preponderance of evi-

10

,

and lmnlen of proof (R. 218, 219, 221). They dithat no verdict could be based upon speculation
or cunj<'(·ture (R. 222) and expressly cautioned that the
j 11 ry could not award speculative damages, meaning
damages which, "althougli possible," were "remote,
1·1111.i<'ctnrnl, or spreulativr." (R. 237) (Emphasis added).
Tlie eomt imlicated that the jury was not bound by the
11pinio11s of C'xpert witnesses, and that it could reject
,nch opillions if they were unsom1d (R. 243). Last of
all, the court required that the damages for doctors,
medicinC>s, x-rays, ancl hospital se1Tices were to be limitt'rl to tl10sr "actually" incurred not to exceed $377.50

ii.''!<'<',
,

•1 ,. • .[

I H. 2:3-1).

\Vithout proof of the value of any loss (including
1·arning-s) related to future surgery, and in the absence
of an instruction specifically dealing with the subject
of future surgery, it is assumed that the jurors, pre·'nmahly persons of reasonable intelligence, could not
fail to understand that no recovery for medical expenses
iHC'idcnt to surgery could be had. 1 ° Furthermore, on
:1ppral, the eourt is "obliged to indulge the assumption"
1liat thr jurors followed the instructions as given by the
('IJlll'l. 11

( '.

Tlic "Moore" Holding Did Not Require the
to Gire [11sfrucfion No. 21.

f1ial ('1111rl

This c·ourt, in JloorP r. Dc11cer and Rio Grande
11'1·sten1 R11if1rny Company,

·I

4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P.2d 849,

'"See: Mazzotta t'. Los Angeles R. Corp., 25 Cal 2d 165, 153 P.2d 338.
''Moore '" Denver and Rio Grande Western Railway Company,
IJtah ld 255, 292 P.2d 849.

11

thP trial court for failing to

au instruetio 11
'
n•quest('d hy tiJP defendants, whid1
the qlll'Stiou of a disc injury from th<> coHsid<•ratiou of the• jnr:
'rlw majorit:v opinion h<·l<l that tht> prnof of th<' di,.;c in_
-

1

jury was not prohatin>. It is tl1is JH'inciple whieh d1·frnse counsel assPrts is applica hle to the ins taut <·asP.
The plaintiff argues tliat this court did not i11tc11il
it8 Jloore dc,ci,.;ion to have thl' effect argtwd on appeal
11y tl1e defendants. In /11 fle Hi!'l1anls Rstate, :i rtal 1
2d 106, 297 P.2d 342, it was argtwd that the tcstimom
of all exrwrt witness -was so nncPrtain and Yague that
it should not have heen submitted to the jury. Tlw
Jfoore case was cited as authority for this propositio11.
'l'his court, finding the <•Yidt>nce admissible, held this to
he an erroneous interpretation of the Jl1 oo re holding.
It stat0d simply that Jf oore held" in tlie 1wrtic11lar co11-

text" that the experts' qnalifying phrases renderrd thi>
tc>stimony "too insubstantial \\·lien standiHg alone !11
support the \'erdid. "'" (
pha sis add Pd)
D. The [;_,'z·ide11ce S11lJ111ifterl lJ.IJ flte Plaintiff uu t/11'
lss11e of Puf11re Surgery 1cas Probatire.
Tlw trial court could not condrnle !hat there

wci:;

''Note that the concurring opinion in the Moore case criticized the
reasoning of the majority, concluding that,
'". . . instead of succumbing to specious pretexts of ingenious
counsel to avoid a distasteful result, judicial forthrightness requim
recognition that the verdict was so excessive that it must have resulted from passion and prejudice, and the granting of a new mal
on that ground."
Counsel suggests that the main thrust of the cited portion of the
concurring opinion refers to the argument that the evidence was nor
probative, and to the conclusion that failure to give the defendants 1n·
struction constituted reversible error. The concurring opinion
prophetically cited the legal "cliche" that "harsh cases make bad law.

12

111• nwdir:d (·\·idern·0 produC'ccl hy which the jury could

i'illd tli:1t "mgery would be requirc>cl. If the evidence
1rns prnl1;d in', and if it posed an issue for the jury,
.1"" 'lJ1· prnposPcl instruetio11 was correctly denie(l.
Tlic• t reati11g physician testified that there was a
1.-J pL·r c·(·nt chance> that surgery would be required. The
d<'fcnda11ts' argumc11t, simplified, is that unless there
is a
1wr ce11t cliancc, the jury could ne\·er find for
till' proposition by a preponderance of the evidence (R.
li20-fi26). This, it is argued, is tlw legal effect of the
l1olding in the Jloorl! casr. The logical c>xtension of the
dde11dm1ts' argumPnt is that proof of any co11clition,
liH\·i11g a ehauce for surgery of less than 50 per cent, is
111)t prohatin>, and is, by means of an instruction, to be
automatically removed from the considrration of the
.111r:>.

'l'he applicatio11 of this formula denies reality. It
'uggc•sts that a
ea1111ot find, or consider, with the
e1i1 l l)f thc medical testimony and other proof, that which
i.-; i11 fa<'t trne. That is, that a plaintiff, as a result of
l1is injuries and of the negligence which caused them
l1a., n l;) pPr cent, or, as the case may be, a 49 per cent
d1a11ce of future surgery.
The ph1illtiff sug1£ests that the correet formula is
that a j my could find by a preponderance of the ev1rl1·11C'l' that therP is a 15 per cent chance of future sur:.;1·1')·, and consic1Pr the fad accordingly. This appears
lo liL' the position taken by the majority of the cases that

13

have considered the matter. 13 If the court agrees with
the plaintiff on this point alone, all other considerations
notwithstanding, the clefondants' argument urn1er Point
II must fail. The defendants' proposNl instrncti on wa,
solidly based on the proposition that there was no medical e\-idence presented at the trial upon which a jury
conld find that surgery would be necessary. Given probative evidence, upon which a jury could predicate a
finding, the instruction was clearly incorrect (R. 211).
Although these com;iderations become less significant gin•n the plaintiff's wain·r of any claim for such '
damages, and his failure to pro,-e the value of any s11eh
loss or to pursue the matter in argument, the court pro11denied the instruction.

The Court's Failure to Giue the Requested Insf rucf ion !Jirl Not, !11 A11.11 Ere11t, C'omditutc Prej11rlicial
Error.
K

Analysis of Dr. Soderherg's tt•stimony, and of the
mediral facts, demonstrates that the amount of tile
's ,-erdict ,,-as fully justifif'd h>- tlte plaiutiff 's i11juries, futurP surgery notwithstanding. The c1efonda11t
has essentially abandoned on appeal its contention that
the damages \\'ere exceRsin· although this was asserted,
without argument, at the hearing on the :\'lotion for a
Trial (R. 260). It is arguf'd
that the amon11t
of the \'t•rc1ict is "strong irnlieation" that the jury found
damages for fntun• pain nrnl snffrring associat0d witl 1
''See: Dornberg v. St. Paul City R. Co., 253 Minn 52, 91 NW 178,
Also: Annotation 69 ALR2d 1271.
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a Cl'JTiC'al fusion. Nothing, other than the amount of
thr a ward, is asserted to permit such an inference. As
rhe
:ouri Supreme Court stated in Sang v. St. Louis,
.::!i2 ;\[o. 454, 171 SW 347, it "would be trifling with
justice to suppose that the jury allowed anything of
substance on the issue of future medical services.''
!H;mpha sis added).
In the same Utah rase which confined the Moore
decision to its own particular facts, 14 the trial court refused to give an instruction to the effect that the burden of showing lack of testamentary capacity was upon
the contestants in a will contest. That this was the law
was undisputed. It was indicated on the instruction by
1he trial judge that the charge was "given by implication." This court held on appeal that while it might
have been desirable to give the requested instruction,
and would not have been error to do so, failure to do
so did not justify a reversal. Only when the jury was
iusufficiently advised of the issues to be determined,
or C"onfused or misled to the prejudice of the complaining party, did the refusal to give an instruction constitute thP basis for a reversal.
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides that if there is error, no new trial
shall be granted or judgment be disturbed, unless refusal to take such action appears "inconsistent with
justice." Nothing so appears in the instant
ease.
''ln Re Richards Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P.2d 542.
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The defowlm1ts' profforred i11structio11 did rnit "]Jl·cifi('ally purport to cover damages related to pain ll'"I
suffering. It was limited by its terms to damages fo 1
"possihlP future disability" or expenses of "surgienl
treatment.'"-· Ha<l tlw instruction been given, it would
havP fur11islwd the jury with no guidance with respect
to the issue of damage:-: for pain and suffering.

POINT Ill
THE TRIAL
PROPERLY APPLIED SETTLFJD PRINCIPLES OF LAW
IN DIRBJCTING THE JURY TO CORRECT
ITS VERDICT.
Plaintiff's c·om1sP! argued in condmliug the plai11t iff 's en:-;(_• that the plaintiff had expemlPd $377.:iO for
medical expenses, $65.00 for air fare to Norfolk, Virguua, and that he had lost $1,255.00 iu earnings as a
result of his injuries (R. 490-491). The total of the
above items was
Counsel made a per diem
argume11t with respect to damages for pain and suffering ( R.492-494). The court, without discussion of
air fan• and lost earnings, had instructed the jury that
the total amount of special damages should 11ot execcrl
the sum of $31/JiO, the amount of the medical special.-<
(R 234).
TliP jury retumed with a total ,·enliet of $11,700.00,
$1,700.00 of wliieh was eharackriz<•d a:-: gp11eral <lamag<·s am! $10,000.00 of \Yhich was d1araetcrized as :oqw1 '·This is also the interpretation earlier placed on the instruction b)
defense counsel (R. 526).
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1

ta! 'la rnages ( R. 255-A). During a conference in ch am-

'." r' 1 di:·wnss the error, plaintiff's counsel called to
:he attentio11 of the trial court the fact that the air fare,
the nwdical expenses, and the lost earnings totalled
roughly $1,700.00 (R. 504). Counsel also, before the return of the jury, called to the court's attention the fact
that the jury had inadvertently inserted the special damage item in the general damage section of the verdict
form all(] vice \·ersa (R. 509).iu
1

1

A
the conference in chambers, the court asked
the jury to return to the jury room and reconsider its
\"Prdid in light of the court's earlier instructions, partieularly those haYing reference to the issue of damages
(H. 508).

The jury, following the court's advice, returned to
the jury room, discussed the matter and corrected the
\'crdict to read $377.50 special damages and $11,332.50
1;r1wrnl damages. The amount of the verdict, $11,700.00,
n·mainecl constant.
The defendants' .Jlotio11 for a Xew Trial was i>rimarily hased upon the alleged irregularity of the proc«•edi11gs as abon described (R. 259). The transcript
of tltt• df'f<•nclants' argument on its .Jlotion for a New
Trinl reflects the following interchange:
COURT: "What is your comment on Rule 47R
and Jorgensen versus Gonzales? \Yha t have you
got to say about about those two items?"
1

'·See also counsel's comments in the Record at 504.
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MR. WADSWORTH: "I don't know. I'd have
to read them." (R. 532)
The Judge then concluded that Jorgensen o. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330, 383 P.2d 934 (1963), with rule
47(r) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was "deeisive" of the isslws raised h>· the defendants' motion
(R. 533).
Despite the especial significance attached to the
Gonzales case by the trial court, and to Rule 47(r), these
authorities han heen again ignored hy the defenda11(:.;
on appeal."
Rule 47 ( r) indicates:

"Correction of Verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be corrected by the jury under the ad,·ice of the court,
or the jury may he sent out again.''
.!orgc11se11 r. Gonzales, supra, is dispositin' of tlw j,.
sues raised by Point III of th0 appellant's hrief, both
as goyerning precedent and as a logical proposition.
In Gonzales, an automobile collision case, the jury returned a verdict of $368.49 special damages and $1,131.51
general damages. The odcl amounts of the damages
causecl the court to question the jury foreman about the
possibility of a quotient 01· chance verdict. Discussion
disclosed that the jury had considered the plaintiff',
tra,·el expense from California to Utah as an item of
general damage. The defendant asserted and the plain17 See Appellants Brief, page 17. Appellant refers to Rule 47(r) and
to State v. Gonzales without analysis, except to say chat they served as
authorization for the trial judge's decision to direct the jury to reconvene.
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tiff conceded that this was incorrect. The court directed
the ju "Y to go out and reconsider its verdict. After re·.·on»iderntion, the jury returned with a second corrected
renlict of $368.49 special damages and $1,200.00 gen<·ral damages. Note that, unlike the instant case, the
amount of the total verdict was increased adversely to
the interest of the defendant-appellant.
This court, in referring to Rule 47 ( r) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, concluded that,
''The general and well-established rule is
that so long as the jury is functioning as such in
the course of a trial and until it is discharged,
it is subject to directions and instructions from
the court to the end that the issues be fully tried,
deliberated upon, and a correct verdict rendered.
And where it is apparent that there is some
patent error in connection with the verdict, the
court may of course call the matter to their attention and direct them to redeliberate. In that
regard it has been held, sensibly and properly,
that where an amount is erroneously included
the court may direct the jury to retire and correct it. The trial court appears to have acted
not only within its prerogative but properly and
discreetly in handling the situation.''
The principle of the Gonzales case is widespread.
[t i8 applicable when a verdict is "informal," "insensihl0,'' "repugnant," "not responsive to the issues submitted,'' or ''in disregard of the instructions of the
rourt. '' Although, counsel asserts, none of these elemrnts were present in the instant case, the practice of
JlPrmitting a jury to reconvene to reconsider is merely
an application of the "settled rule" that "until the

19

verdict has been recorded, or the jury have been discharged as unable to agree, their connection with thP
case has not come to an end." Bla,in c. Yor:key, 117 Col(),
20, 18-1- P.2<l 1915. See also: Bortek u. Pliilarlelphia
Rapid Tnmsit Co., 13 A 856, Baldwin c. Eruing, 69 Idaho
17G, 204 P.2d 430, Sparks r. Berntsen, 19 Cal.2d 308,
121 P.2d -1:07, Holloicay r. Ecans, 33 N.M. 601, 238 P.2rl
457, 8a.1·ko r. Brookl.1;11 a11d Queens Transit Corp., 1
489, 1661\Iisc 84.
'flw ddem1ant makes rnneh of tlw point that tl11,
jury did not redeliberate, that it merely retired, ma<le
a mathematical calculation and returned. Nothing i11
th0 record substantiates sneh a conclusion, other than
the fact that the second retirement "·as brief. How brief,
is diffienlt to determine from the record which is am·
Lignous and confus0d on the point." Cases such as thosr
citPd in the appellants' brief"' which inn>ln•
wl1ich stubbornly refuse to follow tlw instructions of
the court on matters invoking substantive change, are
markedly nuhelpful when consi(1ering corrections invoh·ing matters of form.
A jury nrdict that, "\Ye• fiml for the plaintiff, JJO
cause of action," is easily corrected. It requires no suhstantial r<>eonsideration. To gauge the validity of the
1 'Note that the record, p. 508, indicates that the court returned and
requested the jury to reconsider its verdict at
p.m. and the record,
p. 510, indicates that the jury returned with th€ corrected verdict at 4:41
p.m.

'"See especially Feruzza v. City of Pittsburgh, 394 Pa. 70, 145 A.2d
706, where the jury, without adequate deliberation, defied the judge,
adding attorney fees, court costs, and additional damages by "indirection," correctly called by the court "capricious'" and ··unjustifiable."

111rtP< 'ion rn terms of the time required to effect it,
" ..uld rdeh credulity. ·when a jury considers the elem<'llts of damage eorrectly, even though confusing such
<·011erpts as general and special damages and reflecting
thc>m i11eorrectly as to form on the verdict, a mere me<'hanie:d ehangp or mathematical calculation is indicated.
Restating the languagp of the Gonza,les case, '' ... where
an amount is rrroneously included the court may direct
the jury to rPtire and correct it.''
Furthermore, Rule 47 ( r) provides that an informal
or i11snfficiPnt verdict "may be corrected by the jury
11111/er the arfrice of the court, or the jury may be sent
olff urmi11." (Emphasis added). The rule then provides,
alternatively, that such matters may be resolved and
ne(·essary corrections made by a jury reconvened at
lht> direction of the court, or by a jury operating in open
<·ourt with the judge's assistance, without redeliberation.

POINT IV
THE PROCEDURES AT AND BEFORE
THE HEARING ON DEFENDANTS' MO'l'TON FOR A NEW TRIAL WERE PROPER
A N"D DID NOT PREJUDICE THE DEFENDANTS.
The defendants eo11teJl(l that plaintiff's eounsel
adecl improp< rly by submitting affidavits of jurors to
flH• eon rt in a<h·ai1ce of the hearing on defendants' Motion for a New Trial. The questioned documents are inclu<led in the record on appeal (R. 261-266). It is as·'erted that the affidavits should have been submitted
1
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as exhibits to the plaintiff's rebuttal argument to t!iP
defendants' l\Iotion for a N cw Trial. This woulfl km·
permitted, counsel reasons, the court to have rulrd
the issu<> of admissibility before the offending docu
ments were ma<le a part of the record. The advance
submission of the affidavits is alleged to have been
"highly improper" and possibly prejudicial to the de.
fendants' position with respect to the l\Iotion for a New
'!'rial.
In providing counsel and the court with the pro
l'oscd :1ffidaYits in ach·ance of the hearing, tlw plai11tiff
was complying with the specific provisions of Rule 59(r)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule require,
the moving party on a Motion for New Trial hase<l
upon suhdiYisions 1 through 4 of RulP 59 to support tli1·
motion hy affithn-it."" It further rPquires that thr opposing party has 10 clays, after service of the moYing
party's motion, within which to serve opposing affidaYits. Ha<l plaintiff's counsel \rnitPd until the morning
of the hearing to produce the proposed affidavits, it is
most likely that the court would have rejected them,
not on their merits as it did, hut on technical grounds,
011 defendants' motion, on the theor>· that they \\'PJ'('
1rntimPI:· aml took tlie cle>fcndants by snrprisP.

A careful reading- of the record indieatcs that no
q ne>stion of the impropriety of counsel was raised b;·
the defrmlants with the trial court whc!l tl1c• afficla1·it:-:'
admissibility was discussed (R. 516-517). ThP court
""Although the Defendants' motion, based in large part on Rule
59(a)(l), was unsupported.

:·01wlude<l that the affidavits were filed to impeach the
",·;-diet of the jury (R. 517), that such use was not perhy law (R. 517), and that it was not going to con"irler thrm (R. 516).
It is presumed on appeal that the court disregarded
improperly admitted evidence in arriving at its decision.

Re /Janiels Estate, 185 Oreg. 642, 205 P.2d 167. This
court has recited frequently the proposition that a trial
judge hearing a case without a jury is assumed to have
;;nperior knowledge as to the competency of and the
effect to be given evidence. Super Tire Market, Inc. v.
Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132. It is presumed
that the trial judge considered only the part of the testiwhich was material, competent and relevant. Big
eottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Ka;y, 108 Utah 110, 157
P.2d 795.

Xote that the presumption that the trial court can
"separate the wheat from the chaff" is most often indulged in situations where evidence is admitted and the
reeonl is silent as to the basis for the judge's decision.
I11 tl1e instant case, it is unnecessary to speculate as to
the influence of the affidavits on the final decision. The
.imlgP was explicit, saying bluntly with respect to the
1locumrnts, "I'm not going to consider them." (R. 516).
It is difficult to conceive, under such circumstances,
that the affidavits had any prejudicial effect, or that
the attempt to use them constituted harmful error. The
ap1wlla11ts have not attempted to articulate the basi,;
for a daim of prejudice or to explain in what way the
rontPnts of the affidavits were offensive. The whole

matter is best considered as involving nothing more
than a question of the admissibility of evidence,2 1 evi.
deuce which was rejected by the court and whie,11 ha;.; w.
bearing on its decision.""
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in grant.
ing Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial at the conclusion
of the first trial. Further, a careful reading of the rec.
ord of the second trial dispels the notion that any error
was committed which would justify a reversal of the
judgment of the trial court. The judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOEL M. ALLRED
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent

" 1 It would be incorrect to characterize the affidavits as an effort to
"impeach" or "question" the verdict of the jury, something the plaintiff
had no desire to do. It is possible, however, that insofar as they at·
tempted to show the grounds for the verdict and the reasoning process
of the jury, they were still inadmissible under the rule of Wheat r.
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railway Company, 120 Utah 418, 250
P.2d 932. However, as an evidential matter, any potential "mischief'
from such a "post mortem" was effectively foreclosed by the refusal ot
the trial court to consider the documents.
""The trial judge, as previously indicated, called Rule 47(r) and
State v. Gonzales, supra, "decisive" of the issues involved on the Mouon
for a New Trial.
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